This paper presents decentralized multi-authority attributebased encryption and signature (DMA-ABE and DMA-ABS) schemes, in which no central authority exists and no global coordination is required except for the setting of a parameter for a prime order bilinear group and a hash function, which can be available from public documents, e.g., ISO and FIPS official documents. In the proposed DMA-ABE and DMA-ABS schemes, every process can be executed in a fully decentralized manner; any party can become an authority and issue a piece for a secret key to a user without interacting with any other party, and each user obtains a piece of his/her secret key from the associated authority without interacting with any other party. While enjoying such fully decentralized processes, the proposed schemes are still secure against collusion attacks, i.e., multiple pieces issued to a user by different authorities can form a collusion resistant secret key, composed of these pieces, of the user. The proposed ABE scheme is the first DMA-ABE for non-monotone relations (and more general relations), which is adaptively secure under the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption in the random oracle model. This paper also proposes the first DMA-ABS scheme for non-monotone relations (and more general relations), which is fully secure, adaptive-predicate unforgeable and perfect private, under the DLIN assumption in the random oracle model. DMA-ABS is a generalized notion of ring signatures. The efficiency of the proposed DMA-ABE and DMA-ABS schemes is comparable to those of the existing practical ABE and ABS schemes with comparable relations and security. key words: attribute-based encryption, attribute-based signatures, decentralized multi-authority system, non-monotone predicates
Introduction

Background
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [2] - [6] is an advanced (fine-grained) notion of public key encryption that covers identity-based encryption (IBE) [7] - [11] as a special case.
In the notion, a secret key is associated with a parameter, Ψ, and message is encrypted to a ciphertext along with another parameter Υ. * An extended abstract of a preliminary version of this paper was presented in [1] at PKC 2013. This provides significant technical contributions over [1] , e.g., the full security proofs of DMA-ABS with more general policies than those in [1] and DMA-ABE, whose scheme descriptions are only given in [1] without security proofs. Refer to Sects. 5.4, 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7, and Appendix B.
a) E-mail: Takashima.Katsuyuki@aj.MitsubishiElectric.co.jp DOI: 10.1587/transfun.2019CIP0008 digital signatures have been studied as attribute-based signatures [12] - [21] . A signing key is parameterized by Ψ.
A message along with parameter Υ can be signed by signing key associated with Ψ if and only if a relation R(Ψ, Υ) holds. The verification for a signed message associated with parameter Υ is executed using the master public key and parameter Υ. The privacy of signers in this class of signatures requires that a signature generated by a secret key with Ψ release no information regarding Ψ except that R(Ψ, Υ) holds. The notions of ABE and ABS require a trusted party called an authority. The authority generates a pair of master public key (system parameter) and master secret key. The master secret key is used to generate user's secret key associated with the user's parameter, Ψ.
In the case of IBE and identity-based signatures (IBS), Ψ is user's identity and relation R is the equality, i.e., R(Ψ, Υ) holds iff Ψ = Υ, and more generally in (ciphertextpolicy: CP) ABE and ABS for a general access structure, Ψ is a tuple of attributes of a user, and R(·, Υ) is a general access structure.
Although ABE and ABS have many attractive applications, a big problem in the notions is that the security of the whole system depends on a single party, the authority. In other words, if the authority is corrupted, or the master secret key is compromised, the system will be totally broken.
To address this problem, modified notions of ABE and ABS called multi-authority (MA) ABE and ABS, have been studied [22] - [26] and [17] - [19] , in which multiple authorities are introduced and each authority is responsible for issuing a piece of a user's secret key associated with a category or domain of attributes, i.e., a user obtains a secret key that consists of several pieces, each of which is issued by each corresponding authority.
Chase [22] initiated the notion of the MA-ABE, and introduced an approach of using a global identifier to tie several pieces of a user's secret key issued by different authorities. Her scheme, however, still has a central authority, i.e., if the authority is corrupted, the security of the system will be totally broken. The MA-ABE scheme in [25] and MA-ABS schemes in [17] - [19] also have a central authority and the same problem as [22] . The central authority problem was resolved in [23] , however the admissible relation is very limited to an AND policy of a determined set of authorities. Lin et al. [24] also removed the central authority, but the system is only secure up to collusions of m users, where m is a system parameter. Lewko and Waters [26] presented the first decentral-Copyright c 2020 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers ized multi-authority (DMA) CP-ABE scheme without a central authority whose admissible class of relations are general monotone access structures (or monotone span program). Their result, however, has the following problems: First, their scheme requires a trusted setup of a parameter, composite number N := p 1 p 2 p 3 (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 are primes) and a generator g 1 of secret subgroup G p 1 . That is, there exists a trapdoor, (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ), and the security of the system will not be guaranteed by the security proof, if the trapdoor is compromised. The second problem is the scheme supports only the small universe of attributes, i.e., the number of attributes is bounded in a polynomial of the security parameter (in practice, it should be exponentially large). The third problem is that the security proof is based on four non-standard assumptions over a bilinear group of a composite order. As for ABS, no DMA-ABS scheme (without a central authority) has been proposed.
Our Results
This paper addresses the problems with the existing MA-ABE schemes as well as the Lewko-Waters DMA-ABE scheme [26] , and presents the first DMA-ABE scheme for non-monotone predicates and the first DMA-ABS scheme.
• The proposed DMA-ABE scheme:
-This paper proposes the first DMA-ABE scheme for general relations (non-monotone access structures combined with inner-product relations [27] ), in which no central authority exists and no global coordination is required except for the setting of a parameter for a prime order bilinear group and a hash function. Note that parameters for a prime order bilinear group on supersingular and some ordinary elliptic curves and specification of hash functions such as the SHA families can be available from public documents, e.g., ISO and FIPS official documents [28] , [29] and [30] , or can be included in the specification of the scheme. The proposed DMA-ABE scheme enjoys fully decentralized processes in the same manner as [26] does; any party can become an authority and issue a piece for a secret key to a user without interacting with any other party, and each user obtains a piece of his/her secret key from the associated authority without interacting with any other party. Remark: The general relations (non-monotone access structures combined with inner-product relations [27] ) supported by the proposed DMA-ABE scheme are: Ψ := ( x 1 , . . . , x d ) ∈ F n 1 +···+n d q for encryption, and Υ := (M, ( v 1 , . . . , v d ) ∈ F n 1 +···+n d q ) for a secret key (some elements x i or v j can be empty, where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ d). The component-wise inner-product relations for attribute vector components, e.g., { x t · v t = 0 or not } t∈{1,...,d} , are input to span programM, and R(Ψ, Υ) holds iff the truthvalue vector of (T( x 1 · v 1 = 0), . . . , T( x d · v d = 0)) is accepted by span programM. If the DMA-ABE for general relations is specialized to DMA-ABE for non-monotone access structures, then n t := 2, i.e., x t := (1, x t ) and v t := (v t , −1), where x t · v t = 0 iff x t = v t (x t and v t are attributes).
-The attribute universe is structured in two layers in our DMA-ABE scheme (same as [27] ). The upper layer consists of a polynomial number of categories or sub-universes identified by t = 1, 2, . . ., each of which is a subset of the attribute universe. For example, a category (or sub-universe), ID (with some t), is a set of identities of humans. The lower layer consists of an exponential number of elements of each category or sub-universe, e.g., a passport number (or email address) of a person (in general, expressed by a vector form, x t ) is an element of category (or sub-universe) t for ID. The layered structure is very suitable for multiauthority schemes, since each authority can correspond to a category. For example, the government is responsible for category ID or issuing a secret key associated with the identity (e.g., passport number) of a citizen. In addition, this layered structure is also suitable for non-monotone predicates as described in [27] (journal version). -This paper proves that the proposed DMA-ABE scheme for the general relations is adaptively secure in the DMA security model under the DLIN assumption in the random oracle model. That is, while enjoying such fully decentralized processes, the proposed DMA-ABE scheme is secure against collusion attacks, i.e., multiple pieces issued to a user by different authorities can form a collusion resistant secret key, composed of these pieces, of the user. The result herein includes, as a special case, a DMA-ABE scheme for non-monotone access structures adaptively secure under the DLIN assumption (on prime order bilinear groups), i.e., affirmatively solves the above-mentioned problems left by Lewko and Waters in [26] . If the relation is specialized to the conjunction combined with inner-product relation, our DMA-ABE scheme is adaptively secure and (weakly-)attribute-hiding with v t (t = 1, . . . , d) [27] .
• The proposed DMA-ABS scheme:
-This paper proposes the first DMA-ABS scheme for the above-mentioned general relations (which includes non-monotone access structures) with the same DMA properties and other features as our DMA-ABE. -This paper proves that the proposed DMA-ABS scheme is fully secure, adaptive-predicate unforgeable and perfectly private, in the DMA secu-rity model under the DLIN assumption in the random oracle model. Here, the privacy and signing query security are proper requirements for DMA-ABS but not for DMA-ABE. -Our DMA-ABS scheme is considered to be a natural extension of ring signatures [31] , [32] . In ring signatures, no central authority and no trusted setup are required and every process is fully distributed. Our DMA-ABS also requires no central authority and no trusted setup and every process is fully distributed. When a user with attributes issued by several authorities signs a message associated with a predicate (satisfied by the user's attributes), many users who have attributes satisfying this predicate are possible signers of this message, but it is concealed which user among these users is the actual signer. In other words, ring signatures are a very special case of our DMA-ABS where the underlying predicate is just a disjunction and each authority is a user in a ring. For many applications of ring signatures, our DMA-ABS is more suitable. For example, in an application to whistle-blowing, an expose document on a financial scandal to a newspaper company would be better to be endorsed by someone with certain possible positions and qualifications related to the scandal than by someone in a list of real persons.
• The efficiency of the proposed DMA-ABE/ABS schemes is comparable to those of the existing ABE/ABS schemes (e.g., [18] , [19] , [27] ). See Table 3 in Sect. 6.8 for ABS schemes.
Key Techniques
First we focus on the key techniques of our DMA-ABE and then move to those of our DMA-ABS. As described in [26] , the central technical hurdle to construct a DMA-ABE scheme is to make it collusion resistant. We follow some established key ideas for the target, global identifier gid [22] and (random oracle) hashing of gid [26] . However, the way of employing the hashed value of gid is quite different in the proposed approach compared to the existing schemes (e.g., [26] ). The major difference is that we target reducing the security of our DMA-ABE scheme to the DLIN assumption, and that our construction is on the framework of dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [27] , [33] . For some notations hereafter, see Sect. 1.5.
One of the advantages of DPVS is that it provides us with a rich structure of hierarchical trapdoors. DPVS V can be constructed on a prime order bilinear group G as a direct product (tuple) of G, i.e., (G 1 , . . . , G n ) ∈ V (G i ∈ G), and constitutes a vector space. A pair of dual (or orthonormal) bases of V, B, and B * , can be randomly generated using random linear transformation X such that B and B * are transformed from the canonical basis A by transformation X and (X −1 ) T , respectively. In a typical application of DPVS to cryptography, (a part of) B is used as a public key and (a part of) B * is used as a secret key or trapdoor. Here, there is a rich hierarchical structure of trapdoors, the top level X, the second level B * , and various lower levels t * ∈ span B * .
A key trick to securely tie several pieces for a secret key issued by multiple authorities into a single secret key of a user is to share a random scalar value δ among these pieces with the form of (δ x t , . . .
denotes a linear combination over basis B * t by linear coefficient vector (δ x t , . . .). Here we employ the (random oracle) hash value of gid, H(gid), as δG ∈ G. It looks, however, difficult to compute (δ x t , . . .) B * t from secret key B * t for each authority t, since it is hard to compute discrete logarithm δ of the hashed value, δG. Top level trapdoor X t now plays an essential role in overcoming the problem, i..e., computing this value without using the discrete logarithm δ. In place of directly computing (δ x t , . . .)
, where x t := (x t,1 , . . . , x t,n ) and see Sect. 5.2 for the definition of (X −1 t ) T (·). A specific central space, V 0 (t = 0), played an essential role in the security proof (based on the dual system encryption technique) of previous ABE scheme in [27] . No such a central space, however, is allowed in our DMA setting, where only spaces, V t (t = 1, . . . , d), generated by decentralized authorities are available. A crucial part of the key techniques in our DMA-ABE scheme is to distribute the dual system encryption trick with the central space (t = 0) to all the spaces with t = 1, . . . , d.
More precisely, the secret-key and ciphertext are of the forms of ( x t , δ x t , 0 n t , 0 n t , . . .) B * t and (s i v i , s i v i , 0 n t , 0 n t , . . .) B t , respectively. Here, s i and s i are shares from an access structure for secret s 0 and 0, respectively. Subspaces with {s i v i } and { x t } are used for decryption, and subspaces with {s i v i } and {δ x t } are for the distributed dual system encryption trick without the central space. To execute the trick over the subspaces, 2n t -dimensional hidden subspaces are employed for semi-functional forms of secret-keys and ciphertexts.
As for the key techniques of the proposed DMA-ABS, there are two major requirements for DMA-ABS, (collusion resistant) unforgeability and privacy in the decentralized multi-authority model. Our target is to construct a DMA-ABS scheme that is secure (unforgeable and private) in the decentralized multi-authority model.
To realize such a DMA-ABS scheme, the top level strategy is based on Naor's paradigm [9] , which is originally a conversion from identity-based encryption (IBE) to (ordinary) digital signatures, but in our case, an encryption counterpart, DMA-ABE, is converted to DMA-ABS, i.e., DMA-ABS can be constructed from DMA-ABE.
Here, a signature associated with policy Υ of DMA-ABS corresponds to an Υ-specified secret key delegated from user's DMA-ABE secret key associated with attribute Ψ, where Ψ should satisfy Υ, and the signature verification is executed by checking whether the signature (or Υ-specified secret key) can decrypt a DMA-ABE ciphertext associated with Υ made by a verifier. Hence, to convert DMA-ABS from DMA-ABE, one more layer of trick, delegating a secret key, should be added on DMA-ABE. The proposed DMA-ABS scheme is constructed on this strategy from the proposed DMA-ABE.
The (collusion resistant) unforgeability of our DMA-ABS can be proven in a manner similar to the (collusion resistant) adaptive security of our DMA-ABE.
A new idea is required to achieve the privacy condition for DMA-ABS, since no privacy condition is required for DMA-ABE or included in Naor's paradigm. In this paper, we develop a new re-randomization technique to achieve the privacy of DMA-ABS, since the re-randomization technique for privacy in the previous MA-ABS scheme [19] is not effective in the DMA-ABS setting due to the fully distributed structure.
For more details on the techniques in the security proofs of DMA-ABE and DMA-ABS, see the proof outline and construction idea in Sects. 5.4 and 6.3.
Related Works
1. The proposed DMA-ABE and DMA-ABS schemes are constructed on the same framework as the (singleauthority) ABE, ABS and MA-ABS schemes [19] , [27] , that are based on the DPVS and dual system encryption technique, however, the requirements for DMA-ABE and DMA-ABS are quite different, or much more demanding. Therefore, many key ideas and core techniques of the proposed DMA-ABE and DMA-ABS are novel and essentially different from those in [19] , [27] as described in Sect. 1.3. 2. As a subsequent work of [26] , Lewko [34] constructed a DMA-ABE scheme over prime order bilinear groups, however, it only allows small-universes for attributes and monotone access structures, i.e., not non-monotone ones. Moreover, another DMA-ABE scheme by Rouselakis and Waters [35] solved some issues of the Lewko-Waters DMA-ABE scheme [26] , e.g., its attribute-universe is large and it is constructed over prime order groups. The scheme is, however, not adaptively secure and under a non-standard assumption, q-type assumption. It also supports only monotone access structure relations, same as those in [34] . 3. The mesh signatures [36] are a variation of ring signatures, where the predicate is an access structure on a list of pairs comprising a message and public key (m i , pk i ), and a valid mesh signature can be generated by a person who has enough standard signatures σ i on m i , each valid under pk i , to satisfy the given access structure. A crucial difference between mesh signatures and DMA-ABS is the security against the collusion of users. In mesh signatures, several users can collude by pooling their signatures together and create signatures that none of them could produce individually. That is, such collusion is considered to be legitimate in mesh signatures. In contrast, the security against collusion attacks is one of the basic requirements in ABS and DMA-ABS. 4. Another related concept is anonymous credentials (ACs) [37] - [42] . The notion of ACs also provides a functionality for users to demonstrate anonymously possession of attributes, but the goals of ACs and (DMA-)ABS differ in several points. As described in [18] , ACs and (DMA-)ABS aim at different goals: ACs target very strong anonymity even in the registration phase, whereas under less demanding anonymity requirements in the registration phase, (DMA-)ABS aims to achieve more expressive functionalities, more efficient constructions and new applications. In addition, (DMA-)ABS is a signature scheme and a simpler primitive compared with ACs.
Notations
When A is a random variable or distribution, y R ← A denotes that y is randomly selected from A according to its distribution. When A is a set, y U ← A denotes that y is uniformly selected from A. We denote the finite field of order q by F q , and F q \ {0} by F × q . A vector symbol denotes a vector representation over F q , e.g., x denotes (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ F n q . For two vectors x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), x · v denotes the inner-product n i=1 x i v i . The vector 0 is abused as the zero vector in F n q for any n. X T denotes the transpose of matrix X. I and 0 denote the × identity matrix and the × zero matrix, respectively. A bold face letter denotes an element of vector space V, e.g., x ∈ V. When b i ∈ V (i = 1, . . . , n), span b 1 , . . . , b n ⊆ V (resp. span x 1 , . . . , x n ) denotes the subspace generated by b 1 , . . . , b n (resp. x 1 , . . . , x n ). For bases B := (b 1 , . . . , b N ) and B * :
For a format of attribute vectors n := (d; n 1 , . . . , n d ) that indicates dimensions of vector spaces, e t, j denotes the canonical basis vector ( j−1 0 · · · 0, 1, n t − j 0 · · · 0) ∈ F n t q for t = 1, . . . , d and j = 1, . . . , n t . GL(n, F q ) denotes the general linear group of degree n over F q .
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces by Direct Product of Symmetric Pairing Groups
For simplicity of description, we will present the proposed schemes on the symmetric version of dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS) [33] , [43] constructed using symmetric bilinear pairing groups. For the asymmetric version of DPVS, see Appendix A.2 of the full version of [27] . Let G bpg be an algorithm that takes input 1 λ and outputs a description of bilinear pairing groups (q, G, G T , G, e) with security parameter λ.
Definition 2: "Dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS)" (q, V, G T , A, e) by a direct product of symmetric pairing groups (q, G, G T , G, e) are a tuple of prime q, N-dimensional vec-
(Symbol e is abused as pairing for G and for V.) The pairing is defined by e(x, y) :
This is nondegenerate bilinear i.e., e(sx, ty) = e(x, y) st and if e(x, y) = 1 for all y ∈ V, then x = 0. For all i and j, e(a i , a j ) = e(G, G) δ i, j where δ i, j = 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise, and e(G, G) 1 ∈ G T . DPVS generation algorithm G dpvs takes input 1 λ (λ ∈ N) and N ∈ N, and outputs a description of param V := (q, V, G T , A, e) with security parameter λ and N-dimensional V. It can be constructed by using G bpg .
Non-Monotone Access Structures with Inner-Product Relations
Span Programs and Non-Monotone Access Structures
Definition 3 (Span Programs [44] ): Let {p 1 , . . . , p n } be a set of variables. A span program over F q is a labeled matrixM := (M, ρ) where M is a ( × r) matrix over F q and ρ is a labeling of the rows of M by literals from {p 1 , . . . , p n , ¬p 1 , . . . , ¬p n } (every row is labeled by one literal), i.e., ρ : {1, . . . , } → {p 1 , . . . , p n , ¬p 1 , . . . , ¬p n }. A span program accepts or rejects an input by the following criterion. For every input sequence δ ∈ {0, 1} n define the submatrix M δ of M consisting of those rows whose labels are set to 1 by the input δ, i.e., either rows labeled by some p i such that δ i = 1 or rows labeled by some ¬p i such that
The span programM accepts δ if and only if 1 ∈ span M δ , i.e., some linear combination of the rows of M δ gives the all one vector 1. (The row vector has the value 1 in each coordinate.) A span program computes a Boolean function f if it accepts exactly those inputs δ where f (δ) = 1.
A span program is called monotone if the labels of the rows are only the positive literals {p 1 , . . . , p n }. Monotone span programs compute monotone functions. (So, a span program in general is "non"-monotone.)
We assume that no row M i (i = 1, . . . , ) of the matrix M is 0. We now introduce a non-monotone access structure with evaluating map γ by using the inner-product of attribute vectors, that is employed in the proposed DMA-ABE and DMA-ABS scheme.
Definition 4: (Inner-Products of Attribute Vectors and Access Structures) U t (t = 1, . . . , d and U t ⊂ {0, 1} * ) is a sub-universe, a set of attributes, each of which is expressed by a pair of sub-universe id and n t -dimensional vector, i.e., (t, v), where t ∈ {1, . . . , d} and v ∈ F n t q \ { 0}. We now define such an attribute to be a variable p of a span programM := (M, ρ), i.e., p := (t, v). An access structure S is a span programM := (M, ρ) along with variables p := (t, v), p := (t , v ), . . ., i.e., S :
where t runs through some subset of {1, . . . , d}, not necessarily the whole indices.
When Γ is given to access structure S, map γ : {1, . . . , } → {0, 1} for span programM := (M, ρ) is defined as follows:
Remark 1: The simplest form of the inner-product relations in the above-mentioned access structures, that is for ABS and ABE, is a special case when n t = 2 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , d}, and x := (1, x) and v := (v, −1). Hence, (t, x t ) := (t, (1, x t )) and (t, v i ) := (t, (v i , −1)), but we often denote them shortly by (t, x t ) and (t, v i ). Then, S :
Remark 2: When a user has multiple attributes in a subuniverse (category) t, we can employ dimension n t > 2. For instance, a professor (say Alice) in the science faculty of a university is also a professor in the engineering faculty of this university. If the attribute authority of this university manages sub-universe t := "faculties of this university", Alice obtains a secret key for (t, x t := (1, −(a + b), ab) ∈ F 3 q ) with a := "science" and b := "engineering" from the authority. When a user verifies a signature for an access structure with a single negative attribute ¬(t, "science"), the verification text is encoded as ¬(t, v i := (a 2 , a, 1)) with a := "science". Since x t · v i = 0, Alice cannot make a valid signature for an access structure with the negative attribute ¬(t, "science"). For such a case with n t > 2, see Sect. 6.4 with our DMA-ABS scheme.
We now construct a secret-sharing scheme for a span program.
Definition 5: A secret-sharing scheme for span program M := (M, ρ) is:
Then, s 0 := 1 · f T = r k=1 f k is the secret to be shared, and s T := (s 1 , . . . , s ) T := M · f T is the vector of shares of the secret s 0 and the share s i belongs to ρ(i).
2. If span programM := (M, ρ) accept δ, or access struc-
and i∈I α i s i = s 0 . Furthermore, these constants {α i } can be computed in time polynomial in the size of matrix M.
Decisional Linear (DLIN) Assumption
Definition 6 (DLIN: Decisional Linear Assumption [45] ):
The DLIN problem is to guess β ∈ {0, 1}, given
. For a probabilistic machine E, we define the advantage of E for the DLIN problem as: GSetup A party runs the algorithm GSetup(1 λ ) which outputs a global parameter gparam. The party publishes gparam. ASetup An attribute authority t (1 ≤ t ≤ d) who wishes to issue attributes runs ASetup(gparam, t, n t ) which outputs an attribute-authority public key apk t and an attribute-authority secret key ask t . The attribute authority t publishes apk t and stores ask t . AttrGen When an attribute authority t issues user gid a secret key associated with an attribute vector x t , it runs AttrGen(gparam, t, ask t , gid, x t ) that outputs an attribute secret key usk gid,(t, x t ) . The attribute authority gives usk gid,(t, x t ) to the user. Enc To encrypt a message m ∈ G T with an access structure S, using a set of public keys for relevant authorities {apk t }, a user runs Enc(gparam, {apk t }, m, S) which outputs a ciphertext ct S . Dec To decrypt a ciphertext ct S , using a set of public keys for relevant authorities {apk t } and secret keys corresponding to user gid and attributes {(t, x t )}, gid runs Dec(gparam, {apk t , usk gid,(t, x t ) }, ct S ) which outputs a message m or a special symbol ⊥.
A DMA-ABE scheme should have the following correctness property: for all security parameter λ, all attribute sets Γ := {(t, x t )}, all gid, all messages m and all access structures S, it holds that m = Dec(gparam, {apk t , usk gid,(t,
We let S the set of authorities. We assume each attribute is assigned to one authority as in [26] , or an attribute is considered to be of the form of (t, x t ).
Definition 8 (Adaptive Payload Hiding of DMA-ABE):
For an adversary, we define Adv DMA-ABE,PH A (λ) to be the success probability in the following experiment for any security parameter λ. An DMA-ABE scheme is adaptively payloadhiding if the success probability of any polynomial-time adversary is negligible:
Setup Given 1 λ , the challenger gives gparam R ← GSetup(1 λ ) to adversary A. A specifies a set T bad ⊂ T of corrupt attribute authorities (and good (non-corrupt) authorities T good := T \ T bad ). For good authorities t ∈ T good , the challenger runs (ask t , apk t ) R ← ASetup(gparam, t, n t ) and gives {apk t } t∈T good to A. Phase 1 The adversary is allowed to issue a polynomial number of queries, (gid, t, x t ), to the challenger or oracle AttrGen(gparam, t, ask t , ·, ·) for attribute secret key usk gid,(t, x t ) . Challenge Let Γ gid i := {(t, x)} queried to the AttrGen oracle with the i-th global identifier, gid i , and Γ 0 := {(t, * )} t∈T bad , where * denotes a wild card (an arbitrary value). The adversary submits two messages m (0) , m (1) and an access structure, S := (M, ρ), provided that the S does not accept any Γ gid i ∪ Γ 0 with any gid i . The attacker must also give public keys {apk t } t∈T bad of corrupt attribute authorities t ∈ T bad .
The challenger flips a random coin b U ← {0, 1}, and
S to the adversary. Phase 2 The adversary is allowed to issue a polynomial number of queries, (gid, t, x t ), to the challenger or ora-cle AttrGen(gparam, t, ask t , ·, ·) for attribute secret key usk gid,(t, x t ) , provided that S does not accept Γ gid i ∪ Γ 0 with any gid i (i = 1, . . . , ν H ). Guess The adversary outputs a guess b of b.
The advantage of an adversary A in the above game is defined as Adv DMA-ABE,PH A (λ) := Pr[b = b] − 1/2 for any security parameter λ. A DMA-ABE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.
Construction
We define function ρ :
where ρ is given in access structure S := (M, ρ). In the proposed scheme, we assume that ρ is injective for S := (M, ρ) with ciphertext c = c S . We showed how to relax the restriction in the full version of [27] . In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector x t := (x t,1 , . . . , x t,n t ) is normalized such that x t,1 := 1. (If x t is not normalized, change it to a normalized one by (1/x t,1 ) · x t assuming that x t,1 is non-zero). In addition, we assume that input vector v i : Remark : Given gparam, the following values can be computed by anyone and shared by all parties:
, return (ask t , apk t ). AttrGen(gparam, t, ask t , gid,
x t,1 := 1) :
return m := c d+1 /K.
[Correctness]
Comparison with the CP-ABE Scheme in [27]
Okamoto-Takashima [27] gave an adaptively secure CP-ABE scheme on DPVS framework. Ciphertexts (CT) and secret-keys (SK) of the scheme have two components, one for decryption and one for shared secret recovering. Concretely, the first corresponds to t = 0, d + 1 component, i.e., (c 0 , c d+1 ) and k * 0 , and the second corresponds to others, i.e., (c 1 , . . . , c ) and {k * t } (t, x t )∈Γ . CT and SK vector components for t 0 have dimension 3n t = n t + n t + n t + 1, where the first n t dimension is the real-encoding part (real part, for short) for CT and SK vectors, the second is the hidden part for semi-functional CT and SK, the third is the SK randomness part, and the fourth is the CT randomness part.
Our DMA-ABE scheme cannot use k * 0 (and then c 0 ) component from the distributed and decentralized key generation. To meet the correctness and (adaptive) security requirements even without t = 0 components, both real part and hidden parts are increased to 2n t -dimensional, respectively, i.e., with 5n t = 2n t + 2n t + n t + 1 inner-structure (see the figure below).
In [27] CP-ABE, a scalar ζ in c 0 , which is independent of the shared secret s i in c i (i = 1, . . . , ), is used for ElGamal-like decryption, however in our decentralized situation, we should use s 0 directly for decryption, so in addition to the corresponding shared secret {s i }, we add more n t dimension in the real part to embed another shared secret {s i } with the share s 0 = 0.
Moreover, the dual system security proof in [27] is accomplished using the hidden part in c 0 and k * 0 . Instead of it, we require more n t dimension in the hidden part in each vector component c t and k * t with t 0 to change each queried key (in the security game) to semi-functional form sequentially i.e., without affecting to the other queried keys.
CT & SK vector (t 0)
in [27] CP-ABE : (
Security of the Proposed DMA-ABE
Theorem 1: The proposed DMA-ABE scheme is adaptively payload-hiding against chosen plaintext attacks under the DLIN assumption in the random oracle model. For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines E 1 , E 2 and E 3 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
, ν H is the maximum number of queries to random oracle H and := ((2d + 10)ν H + 2d + 5)/q.
Proof Outline of Theorem 1
At the top level strategy of the security proof, an extended form of the dual system encryption by Waters [46] is employed, where ciphertexts and secret keys have three forms, normal, pre-semi-functional and semi-functional. The real system uses only normal ciphertexts and normal secret keys, and pre-semi-functional and semi-functional forms of ciphertexts and keys are used only in a sequence of security games for the security proof. (Additionally, ciphertexts have temporal and non-functional forms. See below.)
We employ Game 0 through Game 3. In Game 1, the challenge ciphertext is changed to temporal 0 form. When at most ν H random oracle queries are issued by an adversary, there are 4ν H game changes from Game 1 (Game 2-0-4),
In Game 2-h-1, the challenge ciphertext is changed to pre-semi-functional form, and keys for the first h−1 random oracle queried global identities, gid, are semi-functional form, while the remaining keys are normal. In Game 2-h-2, key for the h-th global identity is changed to pre-semifunctional form while the remaining keys and the challenge ciphertext is the same as in Game 2-h-1. In Game 2-h-3, the challenge ciphertext is changed to semi-functional form while all the queried keys are the same as in Game 2-h-2. In Game 2-h-4, key for the h-th global identity is changed to semi-functional form while the remaining keys and the challenge ciphertext is the same as in Game 2-h-3. At the end of the Game 2 sequence, in Game 2-ν H -4, all the queried keys are semi-functional forms (and the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional form), which allows the next conceptual change to Game 3. In Game 3, the challenge ciphertext is changed to non-functional form (while all the queried keys are semi-functional form). In the final game, advantage of the adversary is zero.
We summarize these changes in Table 1 , where shaded parts indicate the challenge ciphertext or queried key(s) which were changed in a game from the previous game.
As usual, we prove that the advantage gaps between neighboring games are negligible.
For ct S := (S, c 1 , . . . , c , c d+1 ), we focus on c := (c 1 , . . . , c ), and ignore the other part of ct S , i.e., (S, c d+1 ), (and call (c 1 , . . . , c ) ciphertext) in this proof outline. In addition, we ignore a negligible factor in the (informal) descriptions of this proof outline. For example, we say "A is bounded by B" when A ≤ B + (λ) where (λ) is negligible in security parameter λ.
A normal secret key, k * norm (with attributes (t, x t )), is the correct form of the secret key of the proposed DMA-ABE scheme, and is expressed by Eq. (1). Similarly, a normal ciphertext (with access structure S), c norm , is expressed by Eq. (2). A temporal ciphertext is expressed by Eq. (3). A pre-semi-functional ciphertext, c pre-semi , is expressed by Eq. (4) and a pre-semi-functional secret key, k * pre-semi , is expressed by Eq. (5). A semi-functional ciphertext, c semi , is expressed by Eq. (6) and a semi-functional secret key, k * semi , is expressed by Eq. (7) . An non-functional ciphertext, c non-f , is expressed by Eq. (8).
Below, Problems 1, 2, and 3 and their advantages are used, which are similarly defined as those for DMA-ABS which are given in Definitions 12, 13 and 16, respectively. The differences of the problems for DMA-ABE and DMA-ABS are just additional two dimensions for verifying hash values in DMA-ABS.
To prove that the advantage gap between Games 0 and 1 is bounded by the advantage of Problem 1 (to guess β ∈ {0, 1}), we construct a simulator of the challenger of Table 1 Outline of game descriptions for Theorem 1. challenge queried keys
Game 0 (or 1) (against an adversary A) by using an instance with β U ← {0, 1} of Problem 1. We then show that the distribution of the secret keys and challenge ciphertext replied by the simulator is equivalent to those of Game 0 when β = 0 and those of Game 1 when β = 1. That is, the advantage of Problem 1 is equivalent to the advantage gap between Games 0 and 1 (Lemma 1). The advantage of Problem 1 is proven to be equivalent to that of the DLIN assumption (Lemma 8).
We then show that Game 2-(h − 1)-4 can be conceptually changed to Game 2-h-1 (Lemma 2), by using the fact that parts of bases, (b t,2n t +1 , . . . , b t,4n t ) and (b * t,2n t +1 , . . . , b * t,4n t ), are unknown to the adversary. In particular, when h = 1, it means that Game 1 can be conceptually changed to Game 2-1-1. When h ≥ 2, we notice that normal key and semi-functional challenge ciphertext, ( k * norm , c semi ), are equivalent to normal key and presemi-functional challenge ciphertext,
This change of coefficient vectors can be done conceptually since zero vector 0 n is used for the corresponding part in k * norm .
The advantage gap between Games 2-h-1 and 2-h-2 is shown to be bounded by the advantage of Problem 2 (precisely, a slightly modified Problem 2 with the total dimensions 5n t + 1, not 5n t + 3 for each t), i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption (Lemmas 3 and 9) .
We then show that Game 2-h-2 can be conceptually changed to Game 2-h-3 (Lemma 4), where we use the fact that all queried keys {(t, x t )} do not satisfy the challenge S.
Here, we notice that pre-semi-functional key and pre-semifunctional challenge ciphertext, (k * pre-semi , c pre-semi ), are equivalent to pre-semi-functional key and semi-functional challenge ciphertext, (k * pre-semi , c semi ), except that shared
Therefore, this conceptual change is proved using Lemma 13.
The advantage gap between Games 2-h-3 and 2-h-4 is similarly shown to be bounded by the advantage of Problem 3, i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption (Lemmas 5 and 12) .
We then show that Game 2-ν H -4 can be conceptually changed to Game 3 (Lemma 6) by using the fact that parts of bases, (b 3n+1 , . . . , b 4n ) and (b * 1 , . . . , b * n ), are unknown to the adversary.
Game 0 : Original security game. That is, the reply to an AttrGen query k (h) * t ∈ usk gid h ,(t, x t ) to an AttrGen query for (gid h , (t, x t )) with t ∈ T good , and the challenge ciphertext for (m (0) , m (1) , S := (M, ρ)) are:
Game 1 : Same as Game 0 except that the challenge ciphertext, c i , c d+1 , are:
where z i U ← F q , and the other variables are generated as in Game 0.
F q , and the other variables are generated as in Game 2-
AttrGen query for the h-th global identity gid h and t ∈ T good is:
where 4), and the other variables are generated as in Game
and the other variables are generated as in Game 2h-2.
where τ (h) U ← F q , and the other variables are generated as in Game 2-h-3.
Game 3 : Game 3 is the same as Game 2-ν H -4 except that the challenge ciphertext, c i , c d+1 are:
The other variables are generated as in Game 2-ν H -4. Here, we note that s 0 is independent from all the other variables.
It is obtained that Adv (3) A (λ) = 0 by Lemma 7. We will show five lemmas (Lemmas 1-6) that evaluate the gaps between pairs of Adv (0)
. From these lemmas and Lemmas 8, 9 and 12 , we obtain
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
We will show lemmas for the proof of Theorem 1. Below, advantages Adv P1
of adversaries for Problems 1, 2, and 3 are similarly defined as those for DMA-ABS which are given in Definitions 12, 13 and 16, respectively. The differences of the problems for DMA-ABE and DMA-ABS are just additional two dimensions for verifying hash values in DMA-ABS.
As indicated in Tables 1 and 2 , game transformations for DMA-ABE are considered as parts of those for DMA-ABS, namely, Games 0, 1, 2-h-1, . . ., 2-h-4 (for h = 1, . . . , ν H ) and 3 for DMA-ABE correspond to Games 0, 1, 3-h-1, . . ., 3-h-4 (for h = 1, . . . , ν H ) and 5 for DMA-ABS. Therefore, proofs of lemmas for DMA-ABE are given by proofs of the corresponding lemmas for DMA-ABS.
Lemma 1: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
. Lemma 1 is proven in a similar manner to that of Lemma 14, which is given in Appendix B.2.
Lemma 2: For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv ( 
Lemma 2 is proven in a similar manner to that of Lemma 16, which is given in Appendix B.4.
Lemma 3:
For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
Lemma 3 is proven in a similar manner to that of Lemma 17, which is given in Appendix B.5.
Lemma 4: For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, Adv (2-h-2)
Lemma 4 is proven in a similar manner to that of Lemma 18, which is given in Appendix B.6.
Lemma 5: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 3 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
Lemma 5 is proven in a similar manner to that of Lemma 19, which is given in Appendix B.7.
Lemma 6: For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ,
A (λ). Lemma 6 is proven in a similar manner to that of Lemma 21, which is given in Appendix B.9. GSetup, ASetup, AttrGen are the same as those for DMA-ABE in Definition 7. Sig This is a randomized algorithm. A user signs message m with claim-predicate (access structure) S := (M, ρ), only if there is a set of attributes Γ such that S accepts Γ, the user has obtained a set of keys {usk gid,(t, x t ) | (t, x t ) ∈ Γ} from the attribute authorities.
Then signature σ can be generated
Ver To verify signature σ on message m with claimpredicate (access structure) S, using a set of public keys for relevant authorities {apk t }, a user runs Ver(gparam, {apk t }, m, S, σ) which outputs boolean value accept := 1 or reject := 0.
We let S the set of authorities. We assume each attribute is assigned to one authority.
Security Definition of DMA-ABS
The definition of perfect privacy for the decentralized multiauthority ABS is essentially the same as that of the ABS given in [19] . 
all messages m, all attribute sets Γ 1 associated with gid 1 and Γ 2 associated with gid 2 , all signing keys {usk t,1
For a DMA-ABS scheme with perfect privacy, we define algorithm AltSig(gparam, {apk t , ask t }, m, S) with S and master key ask t instead of Γ and {usk gid,(t, 2. Adversary A is allowed to issue a polynomial number of queries, (gid, t, x t ), to the challenger or oracle AttrGen(gparam, ·, ask t , ·, ·) for attribute secret key usk gid,(t, x t ) for good t ∈ T good . A is also allowed to issue a polynomial number of signing queries, (gid, m, S := (M, ρ), Γ) where Γ satisfies S, with corrupted authority public keys {apk t }, and attribute secret keys {usk gid,(t, x t ) } for corrupt t ∈ T bad ∧ (t, x t ) ∈ Γ, to the challenger. For good t ∈ T good ∧ (t, x t ) ∈ Γ, the challenger generates usk gid,(t, x t ) Let Γ gid i := {(t, x t )} queried to the AttrGen oracle with the i-th global identifier, gid i , and Γ 0 := {(t, * )} t∈T bad , where * denotes a wild card (an arbitrary value). We say the adversary succeeds, if (m , S ) was never queried to Sig oracle, S does not accept Γ gid i ∪ Γ 0 for any gid i , and Ver(gparam, {apk t }, m , S , σ ) = 1.
Construction Idea of the Proposed DMA-ABS Scheme
Here we will show some basic idea to construct the proposed DMA-ABS scheme. Our DMA-ABS scheme is constructed on the DMA-scheme given in Sect. 5.2. Roughly speaking, a secret signing key sk Γ with attribute set Γ and a verification text c with access structure S (for signature verification) in our DMA-ABS scheme correspond to a secret decryption key sk Γ with Γ and a ciphertext c with S in the DMA-ABE scheme, respectively. No counterpart of a signature s * in the DMA-ABS exists in the DMA-ABE, and the privacy property for signature s * is also specific in DMA-ABS. Signature s * in DMA-ABS may be interpreted to be a decryption key specialized to decrypt a ciphertext with access structure S, that is delegated from secret key sk Γ .
The algorithms of the proposed DMA-ABS scheme can be described in the light of such correspondence to the DMA-ABE scheme:
GSetup Almost the same as that in the DMA-ABE scheme except that a hash function, H 2 , is added in gparam. This is used for hashing of message and access structure in the signing and verification algorithms. ASetup Almost the same as that in the DMA-ABE scheme except that B * t is revealed as a public parameter in our DMA-ABS, while it is secret in the DMA-ABE scheme. They are published in our DMA-ABS for the signature generation procedure Sig to meet the privacy of signers (for randomization). This implies an important gap between DMA-ABE and DMA-ABS. In [19] , since (a part of) B * 0 is a master secret, other bases { B * t } t>0 can be public. However, in DMA-ABS, by lack of V 0 , public { B * t } t>0 should include modified ( b * t,ι ) ι=1,2 instead of sub-basis (b * t,ι ) ι=1,...,n t , which requires a new security proof in the dual system encryption.
AttrGen The same as that in the DMA-ABE scheme. Sig Specific in DMA-ABS. To meet the privacy condition for s * , a novel technique is employed to randomly generate a signature from sk Γ and { B * t } (t, x t )∈Γ . In [19] , attribute vector x t is encoded on n t -dim. subspace span b * t,1 , . . . , b * t,n t in a secret key. However, in DMA-ABS, by lack of V 0 , the vector is also encoded on another span b * t,n t +1 , . . . , b * t,2n t . To re-randomize both vectors independently using public ( b * t,ι , b * t,n t +ι ) ι=1,...,n t is a tricky part of our signature generation. Ver Signature s * in the DMA-ABS is an endorsement to message m by a signer with attributes accepted by access structure S. The signature verification in our DMA-ABS checks whether a signature (or a specific decryption key) s * works as a decryption key to decrypt a verification text (or a ciphertext) associated with S and H 2 (m, S).
Proposed DMA-ABS Scheme
We define function ρ : {1, . . . , } → {1, . . . , d} by ρ(i)
where ρ is given in access structure S := (M, ρ). In the proposed scheme, we assume that ρ is injective for S := (M, ρ) with signature σ = σ S . We showed how to relax the restriction in [47] , however, for notational simplicity, we do not include the techniques for removing the restriction here. In the description of the scheme, we assume that input vector x t := (x t,1 , . . . , x t,n t ) is normalized such that x t,1 := 1.
(If x t is not normalized, change it to a normalized one by (1/x t,1 ) · x t assuming that x t,1 is non-zero). In addition, we assume that input vector v i := (v i,1 , . . . , v i,n t ) satisfies that v i,n t 0. We refer to Sect. 1.5 for notations on DPVS, e.g., (x 1 , . . . , x N ) B , (y 1 , . . . , y N ) B * for x i , y i ∈ F q , and e t, j . For matrix X := (χ i, j ) i, j=1,...,N ∈ F N×N q and element g := (G 1 , . . . , G N ) in N-dimensional V, for notation gX, refer to Sect. 5.2.
Remark : Given gparam, the following values can be computed by anyone and shared by all parties:
where ϕ t,ι := ( ϕ t,ι,1 , . . . , ϕ t,ι,n t ) U ← F n t q , for ι = 1, . . . , n t ,
., n t . AttrGen(gparam, t, ask t , gid, x t := (x t,1 , .., x t,n t ) ∈ F n t q \ { 0} such that x t,1 := 1) :
Sig(gparam, {apk t , usk gid,(t, x t ) := (gid, (t, x t ), k * t )}, m, S := (M, ρ)) : Proof. Before starting the proof, we first define function AltSig specified in the proposed DMA-ABS scheme as follows:
q , return s * := (s * 1 , . . . , s * ).
Remark: Theorem 2 implies that AltSig defined above is equivalent to AltSig defined just after Definition 10, and this justifies the notations.
We now start the proof. This theorem is true if the following statement is true, where AltSig is defined above: 
Let α := (α 1 , . . . , α ) such that α i := α i if i ∈ I and α i := 0 if i I, and δ := δ + ψ, then it can be rephrased by
where δ is uniformly and independently distributed in F q for each signature generation.
On the other hand, (s * 1 , . . . , s * )
For any {α i } such that i=1 α i M i = 1 and π ∈ F × q , the distributions of (α 1 + πβ 1,0 , δα 1 + β 1,1 ), . . . , (α + πβ ,0 , δα + β ,1 )
are equivalent. Therefore, distributions Sig(gparam, {apk t , usk gid,(t, x t ) }, m, S) and AltSig(gparam, {apk t , ask t }, m, S) are equivalent. For any adversary A, there exist probabilistic machines E 1 , E 2 , E 3-1 , E 3-2 and E 4 , whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
is the maximum number of queries to signing oracle (resp. random oracle H 1 ), and := ((d + 6)ν S + (2d + 10)ν H + 3d + 11)/q.
Proof Outline of Theorem 3
As mentioned in Sect. 6.3, secret signing keys and verification texts in our DMA-ABS are the counterparts of secret decryption keys and ciphertexts in DMA-ABE. Based on this correspondence, we follow the dual system encryption methodology proposed by Waters [46] , at the top level of strategy of the unforgeability proof. Signatures have two forms, normal and semi-functional, secret keys have three forms, normal, pre-semi-functional and semi-functional, and verification texts (ciphertexts) have four forms, normal, temporal, pre-semi-functional and semi-functional (see Table 2 ). The real system uses only normal forms, and other forms are used only in a sequence of security games for the security proof. (Additionally, verification texts have nonfunctional form. See below.) In addition to verification texts, secret keys and signatures, a part of public key, b * t,ι , has two forms, normal and semi-functional.
We employ Game 0 through Game 5. In Game 1, the verification text is changed to temporal form. When at most ν S signature queries are issued by an adversary, there are ν S game changes from Game 1 (Game 2-0), Game 2-1 through Game 2-ν S . In Game 2-h, the first h (including the h-th queried) signatures are changed to semi-functional form, while the remaining signatures are normal.
Then, when at most ν H random oracle queries for H 1 are issued by an adversary, there are 4ν H game changes from Game 2-ν S (Game 3-0-4), Game 3-1-1, Game 3-1-2, Game 3-1-3, Game 3-1-4 through Game 3-ν H -1, Game 3ν H -2, Game 3-ν H -3, Game 3-ν H -4.
In Game 3-h-1, the verification text is changed to presemi-functional form, and keys for the first h − 1 randomoracle queried global identities, gid, are semi-functional form, while the remaining keys are normal. In Game 3-h-2, key for the h-th global identity is changed to pre-semifunctional form while the remaining keys and the verification text is the same as in Game 3-h-1. In Game 3-h-3, the verification text is changed to semi-functional form while all the queried keys are the same as in Game 3-h-2. In Game 3-h-4, key for the h-th global identity is changed to semi-functional form while the remaining keys and the verification text is the same as in Game 3-h-3. At the end of the Game 3 sequence, in Game 3-ν H -4, all the queried keys are semi-functional forms (and the verification text is semi-functional form). In Game 4, a part of authority public key, b * t,ι , are changed to semi-functional form. In Game 5, the verification text is changed to non-functional form since all the queried signatures, keys, and b * t,ι are semi-functional form. In the final game, advantage of the adversary is at most 1/q.
We summarize these changes in Table 2 , where shaded parts indicate the verification text, keys, signatures, public keys which were changed in a game from the previous game. As usual, we prove that the advantage gaps between neighboring games are negligible.
We denote verification text by c := (c 1 , . . . , c ), and keys by k * := (k * t ) (t, x t )∈Γ in this proof outline. In addition, we ignore a negligible factor in the (informal) descriptions of this proof outline. For example, we say "A is bounded by B" when A ≤ B + (λ) where (λ) is negligible in security parameter λ.
A normal secret key, k * norm (with attributes (t, x t )), is expressed by Eq. (10), and a normal signature, s * norm (with access structure S) is expressed by Eq. (12) , which are the correct forms of the secret key and signatures of the proposed DMA-ABS scheme, respectively. Similarly, a normal verification text (with S), c norm , is expressed by Eq. (13), and normal form of (a part of) public key b norm t,ι is given in Eq. (11) . A temporal verification text is expressed by Eq. (14) . A semi-functional signature, s semi , is expressed by Eq. (15) . A pre-semi-functional verification text, c pre-semi , is expressed by Eq. (16) and a pre-semi-functional secret key, k * pre-semi , is expressed by Eq. (17) . A semifunctional verification text, c semi , is expressed by Eq. (18) and a semi-functional secret key, k * semi , is expressed by Eq. (19) . A non-functional verification text, c non-f , is expressed by Eq. (21) .
To prove that the advantage gap between Games 0 and 1 is bounded by the advantage of Problem 1 (to guess β ∈ {0, 1}), we construct a simulator of the challenger of Game 0 (or 1) (against an adversary A) by using an instance with β U ← {0, 1} of Problem 1. We then show that the distribution of the secret keys and verification text (in the final step) used by the simulator is equivalent to those of Game 0 when β = 0 and those of Game 1 when β = 1. That is, the advantage of Problem 1 is equivalent to the advantage gap between Games 0 and 1 (Lemma 14). The advantage of Problem 1 is proven to be equivalent to that of the DLIN assumption (Lemma 8).
The advantage gap between Games 2-(h − 1) and 2-h is shown to be bounded by the advantage of Problem 2', i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption (Lemmas 15 and 10) .
We then show that Game 3-(h − 1)-4 can be conceptually changed to Game 3-h-1 (Lemma 16), by using the fact that parts of bases, (b t,2n t +3 , . . . , b t,4n t +2 ) and (b * t,2n t +3 , . . . , b * t,4n t +2 ), are unknown to the adversary. In particular, when h = 1, it means that Game 1 can be conceptually changed to Game 3-1-1. When h ≥ 2, we notice that normal key and semi-functional verification text, ( k * norm , c semi ), are equivalent to normal key and pre-semifunctional verification text, ( k * norm , c pre-semi ), except that (0-)shared secret {r i } i=1,..., with r 0 = 0 is used in c pre-semi instead of ordinary shared secret {r i } i=1,..., with r 0 U ← F q for some coefficient vector in c semi . This change of coefficient vectors can be done conceptually since zero vector 0 n t is used for the corresponding part in k * norm .
The advantage gap between Games 3-h-1 and 3-h-2 is
shown to be bounded by the advantage of Problem 2, i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption (Lemmas 17 and 9) .
We then show that Game 3-h-2 can be conceptually changed to Game 3-h-3 (Lemma 18), where we use the fact that all queried keys {(t, x t )} do not satisfy S that adversary output.
Here, we notice that pre-semi-functional key and pre-semi-functional verification text, (k * pre-semi , c pre-semi ), are equivalent to pre-semifunctional key and semi-functional challenge ciphertext, (k * pre-semi , c semi ), except that shared secret
.., with r 0 = 0 for some coefficient vector in c pre-semi . Therefore, this conceptual change is proved using Lemma 13.
The advantage gap between Games 3-h-3 and 3-h-4 is similarly shown to be bounded by the advantage of Problem 3, i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption (Lemmas 19 and 12) .
We then show that the advantage gap between Games 3-ν H -4 and 4 is bounded by the advantage of Problem 2", i.e., advantage of the DLIN assumption (Lemmas 20 and 11) .
We then show that Game 4 can be conceptually changed to Game 5 (Lemma 21) by using the fact that parts of bases, (b t,3n t +3 , . . . , b t,4n t +2 ) and (b * t,1 , . . . , b * t,n t ), are unknown to the adversary. Proof : To prove Theorem 3, we consider the following (ν S + 4ν H + 4) games. In Game 0, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients to be changed in a subsequent game. In the other games, a part framed by a box indicates coefficients which were changed in a game from the previous game.
Game 0 : Original security game. That is, k (h) * t ∈ usk gid h ,(t, x t ) , which is a reply to AttrGen query for the h-th global identity, (gid h , (t, x t )) with t ∈ S for h = 1, . . . , ν H is:
where
.., , which is a reply to the h-th AltSig query for (m (h) , S (h) ) with S (h) := (M, ρ) for h = 1, . . . , ν S is:
where δ, ζ i ρ) , which is used for verification of the output of the adversary A at the end of the game is:
Game 1 : Same as Game 0 except that (a part of) the verification text, {c i } i=1,..., , for (m , S ) with S := (M, ρ), which is used for verification of the output of A at the end of the game is:
where z i U ← F n t q , and the other variables are generated as in Game 0. AttrGen query for the h-th global identity gid h with t ∈ T good is:
where 
and the other variables are generated as in Game 3-h-2.
Game 3-h-4 (h = 1, . . . , ν H ) : Game 3-h-4 is the same as Game 3-h-3 except that the reply k (h) * t ∈ usk gid h ,(t, x t ) to AttrGen query for the h-th global identity gid h with t ∈ T good is:
where τ (h) U ← F q , and the other variables are generated as in Game 3-h-3.
Game 4: Game 4 is the same as Game 3-ν H -4 except that a part of apk t , { b * t,ι } ι=1,...,n t , for t ∈ T good is:
where η U ← F q , and the other variables are generated as in Game 3-ν H -4.
Game 5 : Game 5 is the same as Game 4 except that (a part of) the verification text, {c i } i=1,..., , c d+1 , for (m , S ) with S := (M, ρ) in the final step is:
where f It is obtained that Adv (5) A (λ) = 1/q by Lemma 22. We will show eight lemmas (Lemmas 14-21) that evaluate the gaps between pairs of Adv (0)
A (λ) and Adv (5) A (λ). From these lemmas and Lemmas 8, 9 and 12 , we obtain 
Structure of Reductions for Theorem 3
In Fig. 1 , an equality between neighboring games indicates that the left-hand game can be conceptually (informationtheoretically) changed to the right-hand game. An approximate equality between them indicates that the gap between them is upper-bounded by the advantage of the problem indicated. The information-theoretical changes have three types: Type 1 is a (conceptual) linear transformation inside a subspace for a verification text with preserving the secret key and signature coefficients on the subspace, Type 2 is a conceptual coefficients change from the adversary's view through the key query limitation in the security definition (Definition 11), and Type 3 is a (conceptual) linear transformation across subspaces. The DLIN Problem is defined in Definition 6, and Problems 1, 2, 2', 2", 3 are defined in Definitions 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, respectively. One highlight in the game description is a combination of Type 2 conceptual change and computational one by Problem 3, i.e., the transition from Game 3-h-2 to 3-h-3, and to 3-h-4. The type 2 transformation changes a shared secret {r i } i=1,..., with r 0 = 0 on the first block of the hidden part, i.e., span b t,2n t +3 , . . . , b t,3n t +2 to a uniformly generated
which is a local target of the h-th part of the Game 3 sequence. Problem 3 then swaps the result on the first block of the hidden part of the hth gid's secret key to that on the second block of the hidden part, i.e., span b * t,3n t +3 , . . . , b * t,4n t +2 . This change prepares the next (h + 1)-st part of the Game 3 sequence, and at the same time, the h-th result remains in the h-th gid's secret key, which makes all queried secret keys semi-functional at the end of the Game 3 sequence i.e., a global coordination of the local results.
We have shown that the intractability of (complicated) Problems 1 and 2 (and 2', 2") is reduced to that of the DLIN Problem through several intermediate steps, or intermediate problems, in [27] . They are indicated in Fig. 1 by dotted arrows.
We show that the intractability of Problems 3 is reduced to that of Problem 2 in Lemmas 23 and 24. Problem 1 is used for evaluating the gap between advantages of adversary in Game 0 and 1 (Lemma 14). Problem 2 (resp. 2', 2") is used for evaluating the gap between advantages of adversary in Game 3-h-1 and 3-h-2 (resp. in Game 2-(h − 1) and 2-h, in Game 3-ν H - 4 and 4) in Lemma 17 (resp. Lemma 15, Lemma 20). Problem 3 is used for evaluating the gap of those in Game 3-h-3 and 3-h-4 (Lemma 19). They are indicated in Figure 1 by arrows. The rest of gaps between games are evaluated without computational assumptions (Lemmas 16, 18 and 21).
Lemmas for the Proof of Theorem 3
We will show fifteen lemmas for the proof of Theorem 3. The proofs of Lemmas 9 and 12 are given in Appendix B. Lemma 8 is proven similarly to Lemma 1 in [27] , and Lemma 13 is proven in Appendix C in [27] . We describe random dual orthonormal bases generator G ob below, which is used as a subroutine in the following problems.
G ob (1 λ , n := (d; n 1 , . . . , n d )) :
t,i := ξ(ϑ t,i,1 , . . . , ϑ t,i,N t ) A t = ξ N t j=1 ϑ t,i, j a t, j , B t := (b t,1 , . . . , b t,N t ), B * t := (b * t,1 , . . . , b * t,N t ), G 0 := κG, G 1 := ξG, g T := e(G, G) κξ , param n := ({param V t } t=1,...,d , g T ), return (param n , {B t , B * t } t=1,...,d , G 0 , G 1 ). We note that g T = e(b t,i , b * t,i ) for t = 1, . . . , d; i = 1, . . . , N t . Definition 12 (Problem 1): Problem 1 is to guess β, given (param n , {B t , B * t , e β,t,1 , e t,i } t=1,...,d;i=2,...,2n t ) (1 λ , n) ,
e t,i := ωb t,i for i = 2, . . . , n t , return (param n , {B t , B * t , e β,t,1 , e t,i } t=1,...,d;i=2,...,n t , G 0 , G 1 ), for β U ← {0, 1}. For a probabilistic machine B, we define the advantage of B as the quantity Adv P1
Lemma 8: For any adversary B, there exist probabilistic machines E, whose running times are essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv P1
Lemma 8 is proven similarly to Lemma 1 in [27] .
Definition 13 (Problem 2): Problem 2 is to guess β, given
. For a probabilistic adversary B, the advantage of B for Problem 2, Adv P2 B (λ), is similarly defined as in Definition 12.
Lemma 9: For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine E, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Adv P2
Lemma 9 is proven similarly to Lemma 2 in [27] . We use two variants of Problem 2, i.e., Problem 2' and 2", which have essentially same structure as that of Problem 2, as well as Problem 2. The security of the problems can be reduced to that of Problem 2.
Definition 14 (Problem 2'): Problem 2' is to guess β, given
., d, for t = 1, . . . , d; i = 1, 2; e 1 := ( 1, 0 ), e 2 := ( 0, 1 ) ∈ F 2 q ,
. For a probabilistic adversary B, the advantage of B for Problem 2', Adv P2 B (λ), is similarly defined as in Definition 12.
Lemma 10: For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine E, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ,
The proof of Lemma 10 can be reduced to that of Lemma 9.
Definition 15 (Problem 2"): Problem 2" is to guess β,
return (param n , { B t , B * t , h * β,t,i , e t,i } t=1,..,d;i=1,..,n t , G 0 , G 1 ), for β U ← {0, 1}. For a probabilistic adversary B, the advantage of B for Problem 2, Adv P2 B (λ), is similarly defined as in Definition 12.
Lemma 11: For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine E, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ,
The proof of Lemma 11 can be reduced to that of Lemma 9.
Definition 16 (Problem 3): Problem 3 is to guess β, given
← GL(n t , F q ), U t := (Z −1 t ) T for t = 1, .., d, for t = 1, . . . , d; i = 1, . . . , n t ; ι = 1, 2; δ t,i Lemma 12: For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine E, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ, Lemma 14: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv (2- 
Lemma 16: For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv (3- 
Lemma 17: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 3-1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv (3-h-1)
Lemma 18: For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, Adv (3-h-2)
Lemma 19: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 3-2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv (3- 
Lemma 20: For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 4 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
. Lemma 21: For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, Adv (4) A (λ) = Adv (5) A (λ). Lemma 22: For any adversary A, Adv (5) A (λ) = 1/q. Proof. Since the value of s 0 in c d+1 is independent from all the other variables, the verification equation, i=1 e(c i , s * i ) = c d+1 , holds with probability 1/q in Game 5. Hence, Adv (5) A (λ) = 1/q. The proofs of Lemma 12 and Lemmas 14-21 are given in Appendix B. In this section, we compare the efficiency and security of the proposed DMA-ABS scheme with parameter n := (d; 2, . . . , 2) to those of the existing MA-ABS schemes in the standard model (instantiation 2 in [18] and MA-ABS in [19] ) as well as the ABS scheme in the generic group model (instantiation 3 in [18] ) as a benchmark. Since all of these schemes can be implemented over a prime order pairing group, the size of a group element can be around the size of F q (e.g., 256 bits). In Table 3 , and r represent the size of the underlying access structure matrix M for a predicate, i.e., M ∈ F ×r q . For example, some predicate with 4 AND and 5 OR gates as well as 10 variables may be expressed by a 10 × 5 matrix, and a predicate with 49 AND and 50 OR gates as well as 100 variables may be expressed by a 100 × 50 matrix (see the appendix of [26] ). λ is the security parameter (e.g., 128). 
Appendix A: Security of MA-ABS Schemes When Central Authority Is Corrupted
Three MA-ABS schemes, which are based on singleauthority ABS schemes, Schemes 1, 2 and 3, have been presented in Appendix F.1 of [18] . Here, we call them Schemes 1-MA, 2-MA and 3-MA. In this appendix, we will show that the three MA-ABS schemes are totally broken if the central authority (called "the signature trustee" in [18] ) is corrupted.
In Schemes 1-MA and 2-MA, the role of the central authority is to issue its own signature verification key (public key) and a CRS for the NIWI protocol. Their attribute-based signature scheme is based on the OR-proof on attribute authorities' signatures for attributes or the central authority's signature for pseudo-attributes. Therefore, if the central authority is corrupted, or an attacker can get the signing key (secret key) of the central authority, then the attacker can forge a signature for any policy and message, as the simulator for the security proof can do.
In Scheme 3-MA, the role of the central authority is to issue a public key including (A 0 , h 0 ) and signature verification key T Ver, where a 0 with A 0 = h a 0 0 is a secret key of the central authority, and to issue user uid a token τ := (uid, K base , K 0 , ρ), where ρ is the authority's signature on uid||K base that is verified by T Ver.
In the last paragraph of Appendix F.1, a modification based on the random oracle model (ROM) is described such that K base can be a hash value of uid, i.e., K base := R(uid) for some hash function R or the random oracle. By this modification, the token can be simper under ROM such that τ := (uid, K 0 ). Note that, however, even in this modification, the central authority still has a secret key a 0 , and the secret key plays an essential role for the security.
If the central authority is corrupted, or an attacker can get the secret key, a 0 , then for any policy Υ and message m, the attacker can compute S i := (Cg µ ) r i (∀i ∈ [ ]),
a 0 , and P j for j = 2, . . . , t are the same as the original ones. Here, all the notations follow those in the description of ABS.Sign in page 12 of [18] . The obtained (forged) signature, σ := (Y, W, S 1 , . . . , S , P 1 , . . . , P t ), for (Υ, m) is verified validly. That is, by getting the secret key of the central authority, the attacker can forge a signature for any policy and message (even using ROM additionally).
Appendix B: Proofs of Lemmas 12 and 14-21
B.1 Proof of Lemma 12
Lemma 12. For any adversary B, there exists a probabilistic machine E, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ,
Proof. Problem 3 is the hybrid of the following Experiment 3-0, 3-1 and 3-2, i.e., Adv P3
Therefore, from Lemmas 23, 24 and 9, there exist probabilistic machines C and E, whose running time are essentially the same as that of B, such that for any security parameter λ,
This completes the proof of Lemma 12.
..,n t ;ι=1,2 , G 0 , G 1 ). Proof. Let θ U ← F q . If we set, for i = 1, . . . , n t , d t,3n t +2+i := (0 2n t +2 , −θ e t,i · Z t , e t,i ,
For a probabilistic adversary B, we define 3 experiments
Then,
where τ := −θτ and ω ι := ω ι +θω ι , which are independently and uniformly distributed since θ, ω ι U ← F q . That is, the joint distribution for Exp-3-0 and that for Exp-3-1 are equivalent.
Lemma 24: For any adversary B, there is a probabilistic machine C, whose running time is essentially the same as that of B, for any security parameter λ,
In order to prove Lemma 24, we construct a probabilistic machine C against Problem 2 using a machine B distinguishing the experiment Exp 3-1 B from Exp 3-2 B as a black box as follows: C is given a Problem 2 instance,
..,n , G 0 , G 1 , δG 1 ). C sets, for i = 1, . . . , n t , e t,i,1 := e t,i , e t,i,2 := η 1 b t,n t +i + η 2 e t,i where η 1 , η 2 U ← F q ,
where C can calculate D t and D * from a part of the Problem 2 instance, i.e., ( B t , B * t ), while C cannot calculate a part of basis D t , i.e., (d t,2n t +3 , . . . , d t,3n t +2 ), from the Problem 2 instance. C gives (param n ,
..,n t ;ι=1,2 , G 0 , G 1 ) to B, and receives β ∈ {0, 1}. C then outputs 1 − β .
, τ e t,i · U t , δ e t,i , δ t,i , 0 ) D * t , e t,i,1 := ( 0 n t , ω e t,i , 0 2 , σ e t,i · Z t , 0 n t ,
where δ, τ, ω, σ, η 1 + η 2 ω and η 2 σ are independently and uniformly distributed in F q (except with negligible prob-
That is, the above (param n , { D t , D * t , h * β,t,i , e t,i,ι } t=1,...,d;i=1,...,n t ;ι=1,2 , G 0 , G 1 ) has the same distribution as the output of the generator G Exp-3 1 (1 λ , n) (resp. G Exp-3
2
(1 λ , n)) when β = 1 (resp. β = 0). This completes the proof of Lemma 24.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 14
Lemma 14. For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 14, we construct a probabilistic machine B 1 against Problem 1 by using any adversary A in a security game (Game 0 or 1) as a black box as follows:
1. B 1 is given Problem 1 instance (param n , {B t , B * t , e β,t,1 , e t,i } t=1,...,d;i=2,...,n t , G 0 , G 1 ). 2. B 1 plays a role of the challenger in the security game against adversary A. 3. At the first step of the game, for each authority t ∈ T good , B 1 sets
t,ι := πd * t,ι + r t,ι for ι = 1, . . . , n t . B 1 does not actually calculate D * t since b * t,3n t +3 , . . . , b * t,4n t +2 are not available in the Problem 1 instance, but obtains D t and D * t from B t and B * t in the instance. B 1 sets gparam := (param G , H 1 , H 2 ) using param G := (q, G, G T , G, e) underlying param n , and G 0 , G 1 , g T contained in the Problem 1 instance, where H 1 , H 2 is modeled as random oracles. B 1 then returns gparam and {apk t := (param V t , D t , D * t )} t∈T good to A. B 1 prepares a list (Hlist) for answers of the random oracle queries, which has data (0 λ , ⊥, G 0 ) and ((0 λ−1 , 1), ⊥, G 1 ) at the beginning. 4. When a random oracle query for H 1 is issued for a global identity gid, if gid is not queried before, then a fresh δ gid U ← F q is generated and B 1 answers δ gid G 1 and records data (gid, δ gid , δ gid G 1 ) to the H list. Otherwise, B 1 obtains δ gid G 1 from the H-list, and answers it to A.
When an
AttrGen query is issued for a pair of a global identity and an attribute (gid, (t, x t )) for t ∈ T good , B 1 first asks a random oracle H 1 query for gid, then obtains the scalar δ gid from the H-list. B 1 calculates When β = 0, it is straightforward that the distribution by B 1 's simulation is equivalent to that in Game 0. When β = 1, the distribution by B 1 's simulation is equivalent to that in Game 1 except for the case that there exists an i ∈ {1, . . . , } such that c i,2n t = v i,n t θ i = 0, or there exists an t ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that (z t,1 , . . . , z t,3n t ) = 0, i.e., except with probability ( + d)/q ≤ 2d/q since ≤ d.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 15
Lemma 15. For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ,
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 15, we construct a probabilistic machine B 2 against Problem 2' by using an adversary A in a security game (Game 2-(h − 1) or 2-h) as a black box as follows: 
for each authority t ∈ T good , that are obtained from the Problem 2' instance. The H-list is initialized as in the proof of Lemma 14. 4. When a random oracle query for H 1 is issued for the ι-th global identity gid := gid ι , B 2 answers as follows:
When gid is not queried before, then a fresh δ gid U ← F q is generated and B 2 answers δ gid G 1 to A and records data (gid, δ gid , δ gid G 1 ) to the H list. When gid is already queried, B 3-1 obtains δ gid G 1 from the H-list, and answers it to A. 5. When an AttrGen query for the ι-th global identity gid := gid ι is issued for a pair of a global identity and an attribute (gid, (t, x t )) for t ∈ T good , B 2 calculates normal key k * t with Eq. (10), that is computed using B * t of the Problem 2 instance and δ gid as
where ϕ gid,t U ← F n t q . 6. When a Sig query, (gid, m, S := (M, ρ), Γ, {apt t , usk gid,(t, x t ) } t∈T bad ∧ (t, x t )∈Γ ), is issued by A, B = (M, ρ) ), B 2 calculates the verification text (c 1 , . . . , c , c d+1 ) as follows: for i = 1, . . . , ,
. . , ; j = 1, 2, and {e t, j } j=1,2 are from the Problem 2' instance. B 2 verifies the signature (m , S , s * ) using Ver with the above ({c i } i=1,..., , c d+1 ), and outputs β := 1, if the verification succeeds, β := 0 otherwise.
Claim 1:
The distribution of the view of adversary A in the above-mentioned game simulated by B 2 given a Problem 2' instance with β ∈ {0, 1} is the same as that in Game 2-(h − 1) (resp. Game 2-h) if β = 0 (resp. β = 1) except with probability 1/q (resp. d/q).
Proof. We consider the joint distribution of {c i } i=1,..., generated in step 8 and {s * i := s (h) * i } i=1,..., generated in case (b) of step 7.
c i for i = 1, . . . , calculated in step 8 in the above simulation are expressed as:
where ω i := χ i,1 + χ i,2 ω, σ i := χ i,2 σ, and ω, σ, {Z t } t=1,...,d are defined in Problem 2' and c i ∈ F 2n t q are defined in step 8 above. Note that ω i , σ i are uniformly and independently distributed.
When β = 0, replied signature s * i generated in case (b) of step 7 is
where δ i := χ i,1 + χ i,2 δ, and δ is defined in Problem 2', ( z i,0 , z i,1 ) ∈ F 2n t q are defined in case (b) of step 7 above, and ϕ i U ← F n t q . When β = 1, replied signature s * i generated in case (b) of step 7 is
where δ i := χ i,1 + χ i,2 δ, τ i := χ i,2 τ, and δ, τ, {U t } t=1,...,d are defined in Problem 2', ( z i,0 , z i,1 ) ∈ F 2n t q are defined in case (b) of step 7 above, and ϕ i U ← F n t q . Note that δ i , τ i are uniformly and independently distributed.
Therefore, when β = 0, the distribution by B 2 's simulation is equivalent to that in Game 2-(h − 1) except that σ defined in Problem 2' is zero, i.e., except with probability 1/q. When β = 1, since (m , S ) in Eq. (A· 2) is not equal to (m, S) in Eq. (A· 3), the pair (τ i (1, H 2 (m, S), 0 n t −2 ) · U t , σ i (H 2 (m , S ), −1, 0 n t −2 )·Z t ) ∈ F n t q ×F n t q is distributed uniformly in F n t q × F n t q for each t except with probability d/q by Lemma 13, since ρ(·) is injective. Hence, the distribution by B 2 's simulation is equivalent to that in Game 2-h except that with probability d/q.
From Claim 1, when β = 0, except in the event that occurs with probability 1 q , the above game is the same as Game 2-(h − 1), and when β = 1, except in the event that occurs with probability d q , the above game is the same as Game 2-h. Hence, when β = 0 (resp. β = 1), since the advantage of A in the above game is equal to Pr 0 := Pr
This completes the proof of Lemma 15.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 16
Lemma 16. For any adversary A, for any security parameter λ, |Adv (3- 
Proof. Case that h = 1, i.e., proof for |Adv (2- 
We consider the joint distribution of {c i } i=1,..., and { B t , B * t } t=1,...,d . In order to prove Lemma 16 in this case, we define new (dual orthonormal) bases (D t , D * t ) of V t as follows:
Since z i ∈ F n t q is uniformly distribued and no z i are 0 except for negligible probability, i.e., d/q, vector χ i := (0 n t , z i )· F t is uniformly distributed in F 2n t q for F t U ← GL(2n t , F q ) except for negligible probability 1/q. Let f t,i (resp. f * t,i ) be the i-th row of matrix F t (resp. F −1 t T ) for i = 1, . . . , 2n t ,
i.e., F t =
. . .
, d t,2n t +2+i := (0 2n t +2 , f * t,i , 0 n t +1 ) B t and d * t,2n t +2+i := (0 2n t +2 , f t,i , 0 n t +1 ) B * t for i = 1, . . . , 2n t . Then, D t := (b t,1 , . . . , b t,2n t +2 , d t,2n t +3 , . . . , d t,4n t +2 , b t,4n t +3 , . . . , b t,5n t +3 ) and D * t := (b * t,1 , . . . , b * t,2n t +2 , d * t,2n t +3 , . . . , d * t,4n t +2 , b * t,4n t +3 , . . . , b * t,5n t +3 ) are dual orthonormal bases.
In Game 2-ν S , verification text c i (i = 1, . . . , ) are
· · · ) D t , (A· 4)
for i = 1, . . . , , where the coefficients χ i on D t are obtained from the definitions of χ i and D t , and χ i ∈ F 2n t q are uniformly distributed and independent from all the other variables.
And, since no coefficient vectors z i := ((r i e t,1 + ω i v i ) · Z t , r i e t,1 + ω i v i ) if ρ(i) = (t, v i ) and z i :
, g U ← F r q , r i := M i · g T , r i := M i · g T are zero except for negligible probability d/q, χ i := z i · F t are uniformly distributed in F 2n t q except for negligible probability d/q. Therefore, in Game 3-1-1, for the similarly defined dual orthonormal bases ( D t , D * t ), verification text c i (i = 1, . . . , ) are c i = ( 2n t +2 · · · , 2n t z i , n t +1 · · · ) B t = ( 2n t +2 · · · , 2n t χ i , n t +1 · · · ) D t , (A· 5) for i = 1, . . . , , where the coefficients χ i on D t are obtained from the definitions of χ i and D t , and χ i ∈ F 2n t q are uniformly distributed and independent from all the other variables.
In the light of the adversary's view, (D t , D * t ) and ( D t , D * t ) are consistent with authority public keys apk t := (param V t , B t , B * t ). Moreover, since the RHS of Eq. (A· 4) and that of Eq. (A· 5) are the same form, the challenge ciphertext {c i } i=1,..., and c d+1 := g s 0 T in Game 2-ν S can be conceptually changed to that in Game 3-1-1.
Case that h ≥ 2, i.e., proof for Adv (3- 
To prove Lemma 16 in this case, we will show distribution (param n , { B t , B * t } t∈S , {k ( j) * t } j=1,...,ν H ;(t, x t )∈Γ ( j) , {c i } i=1,..., , c d+1 ) in Game 3-(h − 1)-4 and that in Game 3-h-1 are equivalent. For that purpose, we define new (dual orthonormal) bases (D t , D * t ) of V t as follows:
Since no r i , ω i are zero except with negligible probability d/q, vectors χ i := ((r i e t,1 +ω i v i )·Z t )· F t if ρ(i) = (t, v i ) and χ i := (r i v i · Z t ) · F t if ρ(i) = ¬(t, v i ) are uniformly distributed in F n t q for F t U ← GL(n t , F q ) except with negligible probability d/q, where ω i U ← F q , Z t U ← GL(n t , F q ), g U ← F r q , r i := M i ( g ) T . Let f t,i (resp. f * t,i ) be the i-th row of ma-trix F t (resp. F −1 t T ) for i = 1, . . . , n, i.e., F t =
, d t,2n t +2+i := (0 2n t +2 , f * t,i , 0 2n t +1 ) B t and d * t,2n t +2+i := (0 2n t +2 , f t,i , 0 2n t +1 ) B * t for i = 1, . . . , n. Then, D t := (b t,1 , . . . , b t,2n t +2 , d t,2n t +3 , . . . , d t,3n t +2 , b t,3n t +3 , . . . , b t,5n t +3 ) and D * t := (b * t,1 , . . . , b * t,2n t +2 , d * t,2n t +3 , . . . , d * t,3n t +2 , b * t,3n t +3 , . . . , b * t,5n t +3 ) are dual orthonormal bases. Verification text c i (i = 1, . . . , ) in Game 3-(h − 1)-4 is
where the coefficients χ i on D t are obtained from the definitions of χ i and D t , and χ i ∈ F n t q are uniformly distributed and independent from all the other variables.
When 1 ≤ j ≤ ν H , all the coefficients on span b * t,2n t +3 , . . . , b * t,3n t +2 of queried key {k ( j) * t } (t, x t )∈Γ ( j) for the j-th gid j in Game 3-(h − 1)-4 are zero. Therefore, the keys have the same coefficients on D * t as on B * t . The same holds for queried signatures {s ( j) * i } i=1,..., for j = 1, . . . , ν S . And, no r i , ω i are zero except with negligible probability d/q, vectors χ i := ((r i e t,1 +ω i v i )·Z t )·F t if ρ(i) = (t, v i ) and χ i := (r i v i · Z t ) · F t if ρ(i) = ¬(t, v i ) are uniformly distributed in F n t q for F t U ← GL(n t , F q ) except with negligible probability d/q, where ω i U ← F q , Z t U ← GL(n t , F q ), g U ← { g ∈ F r q | 1 · g T = 0}, r i := M i · g T . Therefore, in Game 3-h-1, for the similarly defined dual orthonormal bases ( D t , D * t ), verification text c i (i = 1, . . . , ) in Game 3-(h − 1)-4 is
In the light of the adversary's view, both (D t , D * t ) and ( D t , D * t ) are consistent with public key apk := (param V t , B t , B * t ). Moreover, since the RHS of Eq. (A· 6) and that of Eq. (A· 7) are the same form. Therefore, {k ( j) * t } j=1,...,ν H ;(t, x t )∈Γ ( j) , {s ( j) * i } j=1,...,ν S ;i=1,..., and {c i } i=1,..., above can be expressed as keys, signatures, and verification text in two ways, in Game 3-(h − 1)-4 and in Game 3-h-1. Thus, Game 3-(h − 1)-4 can be conceptually changed to Game 3-h-1.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 17
Lemma 17. For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 3-1 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv (3-h-1)
x t , δ gid x t , 0 2 ,
where ϕ gid,t U ← F n t q . 6. When a Sig query, (gid, m, S := (M, ρ), Γ, {apt t , usk gid,(t, x t ) } t∈T bad ∧ (t, x t )∈Γ ), is issued by A, B 3-1 generates usk gid,(t, x t ) for t ∈ T good ∧ (t, x t ) ∈ Γ as in Eq. (A· 1). Then, B 
i := M i · g <1> T , for t = 1, . . . , d; k = 1, . . . , r; j = 1, . . . , n t ; f t, j := π t e t, j + µ t b t,n t + j , f t,k, j := g k e t, j + µ k b t,n t + j ,
if ρ(i) = (t, v i ) ∧ t ∈ T good , (c i,1 , . . . , c i,3n t ) := (s i e t,1 + θ i v i , s <0> i e t,1 + θ i v i , r <1> i e t,1 + ω i v i ), c i := 2n t j=1 c i, j b t, j + n t j=1 v i, j f t, j + r k=1 M i,k f t,k,1 +θ i H 2 (m , S )b t,2n t +1 − b t,2n t +2 + n t j=1 c i,n t + j b t,3n t +2+ j + q i , if ρ(i) = (t, v i ) ∧ t ∈ T bad , 
Then, from Lemma 13, the joint distribution of ( w −,<b> i , y t ) is uniformly and independently distributed on C ( v i · x t )·τr <b> i (over Z t U ← GL(n t , F q )). 3. γ(i) = 0 and [ρ(i) = (t, v i ) ∧ (t, x t ) ∈ Γ] (i.e., v i · x t 0).
Then, from Lemma 13, the joint distribution of ( w +,<b> i , y t ) is uniformly and independently distributed on C ( v i · x t )·ω i +τr <b> i (over Z t U ← GL(n t , F q )) where ω i is uniformly and independently distributed on F q . Hence, the joint distribution of ( w +,<b> i , y t ) is uniformly and independently distributed over F 2n t q . 4. γ(i) = 0 and [ρ(i) = ¬(t, v i ) ∧ (t, x t ) ∈ Γ] (i.e., v i · x t = 0). Then, from Lemma 13, the joint distribution of ( w −,<b> i , y t ) is uniformly and independently distributed on C 0 (over Z t U ← GL(n t , F q )).
[ρ
Then, the distribution of w +,<b> i or w −,<b> i is uniformly and independently distributed on F n t q (over Z t U ← GL(n t , F q )).
We then observe the joint distribution (or relation) of { w +,<b> i } i=1,..., , { w −,<b> i } i=1,..., and { y t } t=1,...,d . Those in cases 3, 4, and 5 are obviously independent from the others. Due to the restriction of adversary A's key queries, 1 span (M i ) ρ(i)∈T good ∧ γ(i)=1 , (M i ) ρ(i)∈T bad . Hence, the distribution of { τr <2> i | cases 1 and 2 } is equivalent to that of { τr <3> i | cases 1 and 2 }, since τr <b> i = τM i · g <b> T for b = 2, 3, and the distributions of g <2> and g <3> are equivalent except that 1 · g <2> T = 0 and 1 · g <3> T is uniformly distributed on F q .
Thus, the view of adversary A in Game 3-h-2 is equivalent to that in Game 3-h-3.
B.7 Proof of Lemma 19
Lemma 19. For any adversary A, there exists a probabilistic machine B 3-2 , whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that for any security parameter λ, |Adv (3-h-3) 
